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raised on the merits and disposed of in the trial court.98 They
are not discussed here as the court's decision rested on the ex-
ception and no issues on the merits were resolved.
OTHER DECISIONS
Several other noteworthy decisions were rendered by the
Louisiana courts during the 1961-62 term.9 9 However, they are
not discussed in this symposium because they either have been' °°
or will be the subjects of treatment in other issues of this
Review. In addition to Davis v. Laster'0 ' two others of the
more important of these cases, Odom v. Union Producing Co.'02
and Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co.1° will be treated in future
issues.
EXPROPRIATION
Alvin B. Rubin*
In 1954, pursuant to authority granted by a 1948 constitu-
tional amendment, the legislature authorized the Department of
Highways to file a "declaration of taking" and thus to take pos-
session and title of property for highway purposes prior to a
final judgment fixing value in expropriation proceedings.'
98. Obviously this commentary has dealt only with the problem whether there
was a fixed and certain sum involved. If the court had decided that a liquidated
claim was presented, rather complex problems as to the legal relationship arising
from the appointment of a unit operator by the Commissioner of Conservation
would have been presented for decision. On the merits, defendant was contending
that it had paid the unit operator for all of the production from the well and was
therefore freed of any obligation to plaintiff. There is some question whether
defendant could pay the unit operator appointed by a conservation order and thus
relieve itself of any obligation to pay plaintiff for its just and equitable share
of production directly.
99. Odom v. Union Production Co., 243 La. 48, 141 So. 2d 649 (1962) ; Melan-
con v. Cheramie, 138 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Pierce v. Atlantic
Refining Co., 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Namie v. Namie, 134 So. 2d
572 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
100. Melancon v. Cheramie, supra note 99, is considered in the student Com-
ment, 23 LA. L. REv. 106, 111-16 (1962), and Namie v. Namie, supra note 98,
is considered in the student Note, 22 LA. L. REv. 867 (1962).
101. 242 La. 735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1962).
102. 243 La. 48, 141 So. 2d 649 (1962).
103. 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
*Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge
Bar.
1. LA.' R.S. 48:441-460 (Supp. 1962). This was pursuant to express consti-
tutional authority. LA. CO NST. art. VI, § 19.1, as amended in 1948.
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In State v. Bradford2 the department sought to use this pro-
cedure to obtain a servitude on the defendant's land to excavate
dirt which was to be used on a highway project located about
2200 feet away. The excavation would result in what is known
as a borrow pit, 8 to 10 feet deep, extending over 14.97 acres of
the defendant's land.
The defendant contended that the 1948 constitutional amend-
ment and the legislative act adopted pursuant to its authority
limited the "quick taking" procedure to "highway purposes" and
that this procedure could not be employed to obtain a borrow
pit. The defendant contrasted the language of the general. ex-
propriation act3 which expressly authorized expropriation of
"land from which earth can be obtained," with the language of
the 1954 constitutional amendment and its implementing legis-
lation which authorized the taking of property "for highway
purposes."
On rehearing, the court held that the "quick taking proce-
dure" could be employed to take any property needed for high-
way purposes, whether or not the property taken is part of the
highway right of way. The constitutional amendment and stat-
ute are both procedural in nature and they merely authorize
another method by which to expropriate property which the
state is authorized by substantive law to take.4
The courts of appeal continued to be confronted with expro-
priation cases. In most of these the principal question was the
determination of the value of the land expropriated, under the
particular circumstances of each case, and these cases require
no comment.
The Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit held that a judg-
ment in another case involving other parties but dealing with
property of similar character in the same neighborhood as the
subject property is admissible as evidence of value.5
SERVITUDES
Pipe line companies have begun to seek so-called rights-of-
way fifty feet in width because of the size of the equipment now
2. 242 La. 1095, 141 So. 2d 378 (1962).
3. LA. R.S., 48:222 (1950).
4. Justices Hamiter, Hamlin, and Summers dissented.
5., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Nezat, 136 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, Feb. 19, 1962. • , . , ;
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used in constructing and maintaining their lines. In Texas East-
ern Transmission v. Terzia,6 the Court of Appeal for the Second
Circuit held that the expropriating company failed to establish
the necessity of a servitude fifty feet in width, and permitted
it to expropriate only thirty feet.7 The court said that "the
rights of ingress and egress, which are inherent in the use of
the servitude granted, would authorize plaintiff to enter upon
and use additional necessary areas subject to the co-existing
rights of defendant to claim damages occasioned thereby" if
the need arose to use machinery of such size that it could not be
accommodated in the narrower servitude.
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
The total volume of insurance litigation, as usual, was great.
The cases presented a number of interesting questions. The com-
ments that follow cover the most significant.
The Supreme Court held that an injured automobile passen-
ger having received payment under the medical expense provi-
sions of a liability policy on the vehicle was not entitled again
to recover the same expenses in a tort action against the in-
surer.' To require an insurer to pay the same medical expenses
twice under one policy without a definite manifestation of such
an intention would seem clearly inadmissible, which, in sub-
stance, was the position taken by the court. It was observed
that the ruling does not apply to a case where the injured person
is paid medical expenses under a separate contract between him
and his own insurer.
In similar vein the First Circuit Court of Appeal, overruling
a prior decision found to be in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court, held that recovery by a wife for personal in-
juries and a husband for medical expenses could not exceed the
stated limit of a liability policy.2
6. 138 So. 2d 874 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
7. Cf. Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So. 2d 260 (1955).
8. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Terzia, 138 So. 2d 874, 877 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1962).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Gunter v. Lord, 242 La. 943, 140 So.2d 11 (1962).
2; Guarisco v. Swindle, 132 So.2d'643 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
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